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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMMIGRATION LAW:
DETERMINATION OF PATERNITY
FOR ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN, CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUE OR BIOLOGICAL FACT?
Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
533 U.S. 53 (2001)
I. FACTS
Petitioner, Tuan Ahn Nguyen (Nguyen), was born in Saigon, Vietnam,
on September 11, 1969, to co-petitioner, Joseph Boulais (Boulais), a United
States citizen, and Hung Thi Nguyen, a Vietnamese citizen.' Boulais and
Nguyen's mother were never married. 2 Boulais was born in the United
States, but after his discharge from the United States Army, he relocated to
Vietnam and worked for a military contractor. 3 Not long after Nguyen's
mother and Boulais ended their relationship, Nguyen's mother abandoned
him.4 Nguyen then moved in with the family of Boulais' new Vietnamese
girlfriend. 5 In June of 1975, Nguyen, then almost six years old, came to the
United States under the Indo-China Migration and Refugee Assistance Act.6
He was considered a legal, permanent U.S. resident and was raised in the
State of Texas by Boulais. 7
On August 28, 1992, Nguyen, age twenty-two, pleaded guilty in a
Texas state court to two counts of felony sexual assault on a child.8 He was
1. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 208 F.3d 528
(5th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-2071).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 7-8.
4. Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. (INS), 208 F.3d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 2000).
5. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 57 (2001).
6. Petitioner's Brief at 4-5, Nguyen (No. 99-2071). The Indo-China Migration and Refugee
Assistance Act of 1975 applied to any alien who was a native or citizen of Vietnam, Laos, or
Cambodia. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2000) (stating the Act was humanitarian in nature, developing
special criteria for eligibility allowing a larger number of Indo-Chinese refugees to qualify for
admission into the United States). This Act was enacted in response to the large amount of
displaced Indo-Chinese people during the Vietnam War, as well as the civil unrest within their
respective countries. Id. It allowed the adjustment of an alien's status to a permanent resident of
the United States. Id.
7. Petitioner's Brief at 5, Nguyen (No. 99-2071).
8. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 530.
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sentenced to eight years in prison on each count.9 While confined in a
Huntsville, Texas, prison, a United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) agent interviewed him.t0 Nguyen told the agent how he had
arrived in the United States and that he was a Vietnamese citizen.'1 The
INS agent submitted his report and on April 4, 1995, the INS began
deportation proceedings against Nguyen.12 The INS determined that
Nguyen was an alien' 3 convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude 4 and an
aggravated felony, thus deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).15 In
later proceedings, Nguyen would attempt to alter his position, claiming
United States citizenry.16 However, at his deportation hearing, Nguyen
again testified that he was a Vietnamese citizen. 17 Based on Nguyen's
testimony, the immigration judge ruled Nguyen was an alien and, thus,
deportable.18
Nguyen appealed his order of deportation to the Appeals Court of the
Board of Immigration. 19 In 1998, while twenty-eight-year-old Nguyen
9. Id. Nguyen completed these sentences while his case was on appeal and was held by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) pending the Supreme Court's decision. Report and
Analysis of lmmigration and Nationality Law, 24 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1021 (2001).
10. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 530.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Alien is defined as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8 U.S.C.
§ I 101(a)(3) (2000).
14. "Moral Turpitude... refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as
being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed
between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general." In re Short, 20 I. & N.
Dec. 136, 139 (1989); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1026 (7th ed. 1999).
15. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 530-31; see also Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat.
163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000)). Section 1227(a)(2)(A) states:
(i) Crimes of moral turpitude. Any alien who ... is convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the case of an alien
provided lawful permanent resident status under section 2450) 8 USC § 12550)) after
the date of admission, and ... is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year
or longer may be imposed, is deportable.
(ii) Multiple criminal convictions. Any alien who at any time after admission is
convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single
scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefore and
regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable.
(iii) Aggravated felony. Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any
time after admission is deportable.
Id.
16. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 53, 57 (2001).
17. Id. at 57. Neither the court opinions nor the court briefs indicated why Nguyen
told the INS agent that he was a Vietnamese citizen, because he had not resided
there since he was five years old. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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awaited his appeal, Boulais arranged for DNA testing and obtained a
paternity order in a Texas civil court.20 The Board dismissed Nguyen's
appeal because Boulais had not met the requirements as a citizen father for
a child born out of wedlock to a non-citizen mother overseas, as defined in
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 2'
Section 1409(a) states that the paternity of a child must be established
by "clear and convincing evidence" prior to the child's eighteenth
birthday. 22 There are three ways to prove paternity under § 1409(a). 23 One,
at the time of the child's birth, the father must be a United States citizen,
who has agreed in writing to provide financial support until his child turns
eighteen. 24 Two, the father may establish paternity of a child who is under
the age of eighteen and is residing with the father.25 Three, the father can
also acknowledge, under oath, the child's paternity, or paternity can be
established by adjudication of a competent court. 26
Nguyen and Boulais appealed the dismissal to the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, arguing that § 1409's different requirements 27 for unmarried
citizen fathers whose children are born abroad violated their rights under
the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. 28 The court in
Nguyen rejected the constitutional challenge to § 1409(a).29 The court used
the reasoning from the plurality opinion in Miller v. Albright,30 in which
three years earlier the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of §
1409.31 The Fifth Circuit held that § 1409 is constitutional, 32 meeting the
heightened scrutiny standard set forth in the landmark case, United States v.
20. Id.
21. Id.; see also Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 and 42 U.S.C.).
22. 8 U.S.C. §1409(a) (2000). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as "evidence
indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain" BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed. 1999).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4).
27. Under § 1409(c), a child born outside the United States of an unmarried woman,
acquired at birth the nationality of his or her mother, as long the mother had been
physically present in the United States or its possessions for a continuous period of one
year. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
28. Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 2000); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No
person shall be.. deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
29. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 535-36.
30. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
31. Miller, 523 U.S. at 424.
32. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 535-36 (citing Miller, 523 U.S. at 436-38 (1998)).
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Virginia.33 The Fifth Circuit stated that because Boulais did not meet INS
guidelines for establishing Nguyen's paternity prior to his eighteenth
birthday, Nguyen did not meet the criteria for citizenship.34 The Fifth
Circuit granted the INS's motion to dismiss the appeal. 35
Boulais and Nguyen appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and
on September 26, 2000, it granted their petition for writ of certiorari. 36
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated certiorari was granted to
resolve the questions left unanswered in Miller v. Albright.37 Nguyen
challenged Congress's ability to make a statutory distinction between
unwed fathers and mothers, while maintaining their rights to equal
protection, guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.38
In a five-four decision, the Court held that § 1409 was constitutional. 39
The Court in Nguyen v. INS4o found that gender distinction is not forbidden
under the principle of equal protection and Congress can utilize these
distinctions when granting citizenship to illegitimate children born abroad,
upholding the constitutionality of §1409.41 Justice Kennedy stated, "[t]he
difference between men and women in relation to the birth process is a real
one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress to
address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender." 42
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In order to better understand the implications of the Nguyen decision, it
is important to first to explore the roots of immigration and gender
discrimination and their impact on modem Supreme Court decisions.43
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
LAW
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o
establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization... throughout the United
33. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
34. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 535-36.
35. Id. at 536.
36. Nguyen v. INS, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000).
37. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56 (2001).
38. Id.at 73.
39. Id. at 58-59.
40. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
41. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73,
42. Id.
43. See infra Part II.A-B
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States." 44  The Constitution further empowers Congress under the
Necessary and Proper Clause "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof."45
The Supreme Court has upheld this sovereign power to regulate
naturalization throughout the history of the United States, giving substantial
deference to Congress and offering some guidance on naturalization
issues. 46 The questions of determining which people are citizens of the
United States and how those people obtain the right to remain in this
country have not been easily resolved by Congress and the courts.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution states, "[a]ll persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States." 47 The first laws that Congress
enacted to control naturalization were used to prevent certain classes of
aliens from residing in the United States.4 8
The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were passed by Congress to
forbid French immigrants from entering the country, fearing their radical
political ideas would corrupt the country. 49 Although these acts were short
in duration, this marked the turn of the twentieth century, which produced
similar exclusionary laws, most of which were affirmed by the Supreme
Court.50 These naturalization laws excluded the Chinese,51 Native
Americans, 52 African Americans, 53 as well as many other Asian and
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
46. See e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat) 316, 413-14 (1819) (holding that the
necessary and proper clause is defined as "the means necessary to an end... [that employs] any
means calculated to produce the end"); see also INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983)
(stating the plenary power of naturalization is extensive as long as Congress possesses
"substantive legislative jurisdiction, [and] so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend
some other constitutional restriction" (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976))).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. Michael R. Curran, Flickering Lamp Beside the Golden Door: Immigration, the
Constitution & Undocumented Aliens in the 1990s, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 58, 79-95 (1998).
49. Id. at 80.
50. Id. at 86-93 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 703-17 (1893)).
51. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609-11 (1889). The Supreme Court held that
Congress had the inherent power to exclude any alien it saw fit, even if it meant excluding an
entire class of skilled or unskilled Chinese persons from citizenship. Id.
52. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 108-10 (1884). John Elk, a Native American who had
denounced his tribal relationships and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the United States,
was not allowed to vote by Wilkins, a registrar. Id. The Supreme Court stated:
an Indian cannot make himself a citizen of the United States without the consent and
cooperation of the government. The fact that he has abandoned his nomadic life or
tribal relations, and adopted the habits and manners of civilized people, may be a good
.2002]
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European immigrants from obtaining citizenship.54 Two years after the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress finally permitted the
conveying of citizenship on any person born within the United States, not
just those who were born white and free.55
The leading case of this "New Citizenship" under the Fourteenth
Amendment was United States v. Wong Kim Ark.56 The Court held that a
child of any race or nationality born in this country was a citizen.57 This
applied whether or not the child's parents had become citizens of the United
States, as long as the parents had a permanent residence in the United States
and were conducting business in the United States. 58 The Court affirmed
that birth and naturalization were the only avenues of obtaining
citizenship.59 More importantly, once a person was a citizen, the only way
that citizenship could be lost was by expatriation of the citizen, not by any
act of Congress.60
In the early 1900s, Congress did not readily ease its restrictions on
immigration and naturalization, leading to increased judicial involvement.61
However, the Court's rulings in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan62 and United States v. Ginsberg63 continued to demonstrate that
congressional power over immigration was all-encompassing. 64 The Court
in Ginsberg reaffirmed that no alien had the slightest right to citizenship,
reason why he should be made a citizen of the United States, but does not of itself
make him one.
Id. at 109.
53. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393, 411-13 (1856). The Court stated "[i]t is
obvious that [African American slaves] were not even in the minds of the framers of the
Constitution when they were conferring special rights and privileges upon the citizens of a State in
every other part of the Union." Id. at 411-12.
54. Curran, supra note 48, at 92-93.
55. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701 (1898).
56. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
57. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 703-04.
58. Id. at 705.
59. Id. at 704.
60. Expatriation is a voluntary act of abandoning one's country and allegiance to it and
becoming the citizen of another country. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 598 (7th ed. 1999). The
Court held expatriation was a "natural and inherent right" of all people. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S.
at 704.
61. Wong KimArk, 169 U.S. at 704.
62. 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
63. 243 U.S. 472 (1917).
64. See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339-42 (1909) (deciding
that Congress's plenary power to regulate alien admissions also allows it to create regulations and
impose penalties on ship captains who fail to inspect their passengers for contagious diseases); see
also United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 474 (1917) (examining whether a certificate of
citizenship can be revoked or cancelled on the grounds it was illegal because the resident was not
qualified to become a citizen).
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via naturalization, unless all statutory conditions and requirements were
met. 65 These rulings established that the courts do not have the authority to
sanction changes or modifications of the statutes, but must enforce the
legislature's will, because enforcement is critical to maintaining public
welfare. 66 This "hands off' approach was reverberated in Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy,67 in which the Supreme Court upheld the deportation of legal
resident aliens because of their membership in the Communist Party.68
Justice Frankfurter stated in his concurrence:
The conditions for entry of every alien, the particular classes of
aliens that shall be denied entry altogether, the basis for
determining such classification, the right to terminate hospitality to
aliens, the grounds on which such determination shall be based,
have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of the
Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control. 69
Historically, it was the plenary power of Congress to regulate
immigration that had been primarily challenged. 70  However, in the
development of modem immigration law, it was not the plenary power
aspect, but rather the means that Congress chose to implement that power
that had been challenged.7' The Court has held that the exercise of this
congressional authority to restrict immigration into this country must not
override any other constitutional right of its citizens.72 Violations often
involve an encroachment on the citizen's rights under the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause.73 The Due Process Clause provides, in part,
that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."74 It is these continuous conflicts between citizens' consti-
tutional rights and strong governmental interests in controlling immigration
into this country that provide the basis for modem immigration law.
65. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. at 475.
66. Id. at 474.
67. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
68. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 584-85 (holding that naturalization conveys all the citizenship's
rights and privileges, the government only assumes a "honest assumption of undivided allegiance
to our Government").
69. Id. at 596-97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
70. INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919,940 (1983).
71. Id. at 940-41.
72. Id. at 941.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
74. Id.
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B. DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
LAW (1952 TO 2001)
In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act.75 This
Act was a comprehensive series of laws detailing who is a citizen and,
subsequently, who is not and thus subject to deportation. 76 Congress
asserted in 8 U.S.C. § 1401 that citizenship is only available through these
provisions. 77 Citizenship can be bestowed on those persons born abroad of
citizen parents if at least one of them resided in the United States prior to
the child's birth.78 A person born abroad can also obtain citizenship if one
parent is a U.S. citizen and the other is a U.S. national 79 who had been
physically present in the United States within the past year.80 The third and
final way to obtain citizenship is when a child is born abroad to one citizen
parent and one alien parent, and the citizen parent had been physically
living in the United States for a total period not less than five years, with
the periods of honorable military service included in this requirement. 81
This method was utilized in Nguyen's case. 82
1. Immigration Requirements for Unwed Parents
The Immigration and Nationality Act created additional requirements
for unmarried fathers of children born abroad under 8 U.S.C. § 1409.83 The
75. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 and 42 U.S.C.).
76. Id.
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000).
78. Id. § 1401(c).
79. A national of the United States is "a person who, though not a citizen of the United
States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(22) (2000).
80. Id. § 1401(d).
81. Id. § 1401(g). Congress seemed especially concerned with the relationship between an
illegitimate child and the natural mother, and it chose not to give that same preferential treatment
to the father. See S. REP. No. 1057, at 4 (1957).
82. Petitioners' Brief at 7-8, Nguyen, (No. 99-207 1).
83. 8. U.S.C. § 1409 (2000). Section 1409 states:
(a) The provisions . . . shall apply as of the date of the birth to a person born out of
wedlock if-
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and
convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person's birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for
the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years-
(A) the person is legitimized under the law of the person's residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or
[VOL. 78:147
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Act established a distinction between citizens who are married and
unmarried, and also between the genders of citizen parents.84 To convey
United States citizenship to a child born abroad, an unmarried citizen father
must establish paternity in writing or by genetic testing or court order, as
well as pledge his support for the child until he or she reaches the age of
majority.85 This must all be completed prior to his child being granted
citizenship. 86
This is in stark contrast to an unmarried mother whose child is born
abroad.87 That child acquires at birth the nationality of his mother.88 If the
mother is a United States citizen, the sole requirement for the child's United
States citizenship is that the mother must have previously been "physically
present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions" for a period
of 365 consecutive days. 89
The Immigration and Nationality Act's requirement of paternal
acknowledgement and support was not a concept unique to children born
abroad. 90 Congress's underlying policy on immigration promotes self-
sufficiency for aliens. 91 Self-sufficiency was defined as an alien not relying
on the federal government to meet the alien's basic needs, but utilizing his
or her own capabilities as well as receiving help from private organizations
and the alien's own family.92
2. Immigration Requirements for Support and Paternity
A good example of support requirements is the immigration sponsor-
ship program.93 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1154, a United States citizen or employer
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent court.
(c) Not withstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a person born,
after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to
have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the
nationality of the United States at the time of such person's birth, and if the mother
had previously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying
possessions for a continuous period of one year.
Id.
84. Id. § 1409(a).
85. Id. Under immigration law, the age of majority is eighteen years old. Id.
86. Id. § 1409(a)-(c).
87. Id. § 1409(c).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1) & (2) (2000).
92. Id.
93. Id. § I 154(a)(l)(A) (2000).
2002]
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can petition the U.S. Attorney General that an alien is entitled, by reason of
his or her relationship, to entry into the United States.94 Under this
program, no affidavit of support can be accepted unless the sponsor can
maintain the alien's annual income in America at 125% of the poverty
line.95 This support is legally enforceable against the sponsor, with the
potential for the sponsor being held responsible for the alien's welfare until
the alien becomes a naturalized citizen.96 Also scattered throughout the
United States Code is the requirement of paternity testing.97 Under the
Food Stamp Program, an administering state agency, prior to the
distribution of federal dollars, must establish paternity of a child for the
purposes of obtaining support.98 Failure or refusal to do so by the applicant,
without good cause, would disqualify the child from eligibility. 99 There is
not a determination of maternity by virtue of testing "absent" mothers under
this statute.100
3. Evolution of Modern Gender and Parental Rights
These distinctions between gender and parental rights have also
evolved in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court over the last fifty years,
allowing more individualization of parental rights and responsibilities.10'
Fiallo v. Bell102 first dealt with discrimination based on gender and
illegitimacy and its infringement upon due process rights of citizens and
their families. 103 The Court found part of the original Immigration and
Nationality Act unconstitutional because it exempted illegitimate children
and their fathers from receiving the preferences awarded to legitimate
94. Id. § 1154. Some examples of the types of relationship that qualify are marriage or intent
to marry; sponsorship by siblings, grandparents, or legal guardians; and sponsorship by
employers, such as a professional hockey team sponsoring a professional athlete. Id.
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(A) (2000). The poverty line is the "level of income equal to the
official poverty line ... that is applicable to a family of the size involved" which is revised
annually by the Department of Health and Human Services. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(h). The 2001
federal poverty guidelines are $8,590 a year (gross income) for a single person and $17,650 for a
family of four. 2001 Federal Poverty Guidelines for the Forty-eight Contiguous States and the
District of Columbia, 66 Fed. Reg. 10,695, 10,695 (Feb. 16, 2001).
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a.
97. 7 U.S.C. § 2015 (2000).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See infra Part II.B.3-4.
102. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
103. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794. The appellants in Fiallo were three sets of unmarried fathers
and their illegitimate children who challenged the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(l) & (2)
(2000). Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 790-9 1.
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children of both citizens and resident aliens. 04 In Caban v. Mohammed,105
the Court held that unwed mothers and fathers both have the right to block
the adoption of their child.106 Caban overturned a New York statutel07
because it made an arbitrary distinction, disadvantaging a group of "good
fathers" their parental rights. 08 The statute allowed the mother to terminate
the father's paternal rights without his consent. 109 Justice Stewart wrote in
his dissent, "[p]arental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships more
enduring." 110
Justice Stewart's realization that the now unencumbered right of
unmarried fathers to block adoptions could cause problems, came to fruition
just four years later, when the Court decided Lehr v. Robertson.ll' The
Court tailored the Lehr decision more narrowly than Caban, holding that
when a parent never establishes any kind of personal or financial relation-
ship with the child, the Equal Protection Clause does not preclude the state
from creating separate rights for the absent parent. 112 Justice Stewart, now
speaking for the majority, wrote:
the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent
constitutional protection. The actions of judges neither create nor
sever genetic bonds. "The importance of the familial relationship,
to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
association, and from the role it plays in 'promoting a way of
life."'113
104. Id. at 799-800.
105. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
106. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394. Mr. Caban, who had maintained a close relationship with his
two children despite the termination of his relationship with his children's mother, had his paternal
rights and obligations terminated by the husband of the children's mother adopting the children
without his consent. Id. at 383-87.
107. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § I 1I(1)(d) & (e)(amended 1980) (current version McKinney
1999).
108. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394. The court indicated that a good father would admit his
paternity and establish a substantial relationship with his child. Id. at 393-94.
109. Id.; see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 l(1)(d) & (e).
110. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
111. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
112. Lehr, 463 U.S. 266-68. Lehr, an unmarried father who had not supported his daughter,
publicly identified himself as the father and had rarely seen her in the two years since her birth. Id.
at 249-52. He protested his daughter's adoption because he was not given notice and a chance for
a hearing. Id.
113. Id. (citing Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972))).
2002]
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4. Standard of Review for Parental Discrimination
The standard of review used in the aforementioned cases, as well as
that used historically by the Supreme Court in gender discrimination cases,
was intermediate scrutiny.114 Established in 1976 by Craig v. Boren,l' 5 the
"intermediate scrutiny standard" states that in order for a law to withstand a
constitutional challenge, the gender classifications must "serve important
governmental objectives" and must also be "substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."1 16
It was not until United States v. Virginia that a majority of the Supreme
Court heightened the standard of review for gender discrimination cases to
"exceedingly persuasive justification."" 7 The majority in Virginia empha-
sized that qualified persons may not be excluded based on "fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females."' 1 8 It was this use
of the heightened standard that fueled an intense debate among the Justices
in Miller v. Albright.19
5. Miller v. Albright
Lorelyn Miller challenged the constitutionality of § 1409 because it did
not limit the time a mother had to prove her child was a citizen. 120 Miller
claimed this violated her Fifth Amendment Due Process rights because her
father only had until she reached the age of eighteen to establish pater-
nity.121 The majority found that her argument of paternal discrimination in
immigration law ignored the differences between substantive and pro-
cedural limitations in terms of the differences found between men's and
114. See infra Part 11.B.4.
115. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
116. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). A working definition of an unconstitutional classification is those
persons placed by a statute into different classes based solely on criteria wholly unrelated to the
statute's objective. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 78 (1971).
117. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534. Exceedingly persuasive justification demands, "at least that
the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Id. at 524 (quoting
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
118. Id. at 541.
119. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434-35 (1998). Miller was a plurality opinion, with
five separate opinions being written between the nine Justices. Id. Justice Stevens announced the
judgement of the Court and delivered an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id.
120. Id. at 424. Lorelyn Miller was born in the Philippines in 1970. Id. at 425-26. Her
father, Charlie Miller, a military solider, was stationed at a base in the Philippines at the time of
her conception, but he had very little contact with his daughter. Id. It was only after his daughter's
petition for citizenship was rejected by the INS that Mr. Miller filed a petition acknowledging his
paternity in a Texas court. Id. at 425-26.
121. Id. at 424.
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women's roles in the childbirth process.122 The Court stated that the
woman's substantive conduct was completed at birth, whereas the father
can complete his acknowledgement of paternity at anytime within the first
eighteen years of the child's life. 123
The Court also held that 8 U.S.C. § 1409 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act served two important governmental interests. 124 The first
important interest was the promotion of a healthy, relationship between
parent and child and the development of a bond while the child was still a
minor.125 Justice Stevens stated the fact that the bonds may not be fully
realized does not lessen the importance of that governmental interest.1 26
The Court found that the second important interest was that an
illegitimate child claiming to be an United States citizen by birth, in reality,
"shares a blood relationship with an American citizen."1 27 The Court held
that the mother's blood relationship was readily established at the time of
birth due to the usual presence of medical personnel and establishment of
hospital records.12 8 The testimony of the physicians and nurses present at
the child's birth would address the identity of the natural mother, as well as
the subsequent written documentation of that birth.129 The Court found this
proof to be sufficient to establish maternity but an unnecessary formality,
due to these basic biological facts regarding the mother's role in a child's
birth. 130
The Court also stated that the use of genetic paternity testing, such as
DNA, was not a relevant issue because it was not required under the
statute.131 The statute required the establishment of paternity by the "clear
and convincing evidence" standard to discourage fraud. 132 The Court stated
that those individuals who become citizens are more likely to develop ties
with the country. 133 The Court also found that any additional steps that
122. Id. at 434-35.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 435.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 439-40.
127. Id. at 435.
128. Id. at 436-37.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 437. The State Department wrote in a letter to Miller's attorney in Miller stating
that "clear and convincing evidence" was established when the father satisfied both requirements:
physical presence in the United States as a citizen and sufficient evidence of access to the mother
at the probable time of conception. Id. at 425 n.2.
133. Id. at 439.
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fathers needed to take to determine paternity were "well tailored" to meet
those interests. 134
The Court in Miller v. Albright also addressed Miller's argument that
discrimination of unmarried fathers was gender stereotyping. 35 The Court
held that the innate nature of paternity requires formal proof, and
Congress's assumption that "fathers are less likely than mothers to have the
opportunity to develop relationships, [not just] less likely to take advantage
of that opportunity when it exists," was an accurate one.136 The Supreme
Court affirmed the court of appeal's decision and Miller's equal protection
challenge was dismissed. 137
This fractured opinion in Miller split the circuits, with the Ninth Cir-
cuit 138 and the Second Circuit 39 holding portions of § 1409(a) unconstitu-
tional because the statute violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, in direct conflict with the Supreme Court precedent in Miller.140
The Fifth Circuit in Nguyen and the Tenth Circuit followed Miller and
found § 1409 constitutional.141 This split in the circuits only added more
fuel to the debate of gender bias in immigration laws. 42 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Nguyen v. INS to reach a majority consensus on
134. Id. at 440.
135. Id. at 442.
136. Id. at 444.
137. Id. at 445.
138. See United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding §
1409(a)(3) & (4) unconstitutional). Ironically, the 9th Circuit had upheld the constitutionality of §
1409 the previous year in United States v. Viramontes-Alvarado, 149 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir.
1998). Circuit Judge Kleinfield in his dissent in Ahumada-Aguilar stated "we considered the
matter, subsequent to Miller, in Viramontes-Alvarado... [and] under Miller, the statute was not
unconstitutional. Yet today, we hold that it is. This is a surprising approach to precedent."
Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d at 1127 (Kleinfield, J., dissenting).
139. See Lake v. Reno, 226 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that § 1409(a) was
unconstitutional, violating the Fifth Amendment due process rights of Lake).
140. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 445 (1998). Both of the circuit cases were granted
certiorari by the Supreme Court, but their rulings were held pending the outcome of Nguyen.
United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 121 S. Ct. 2518 (2001); see also Ashcroft v. Lake, 121 S. Ct.
2518 (2001). The judgements of both cases were subsequently vacated and remanded back to
their respective circuits for consideration after the Nguyen decision. Ahumada-Aguilar, 121 S. Ct.
at 2518; Lake, 121 S. Ct. at 2518.
141. Nguyen v. INS., 208 F.3d 528, 535-36 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Terrell v. INS, 157 F.3d
803, 809 (10th Cir. 1998).
142. See generally Cornelia T. L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of
Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1 SUP. CT.
REV. (1998); see also Debra L. Satinoff, Comment, Sex-based Discrimination in U.S. Immigration
Law: The High Court's Lost Opportunity to Bridge the Gap Between What We Say and What We
Do, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1353 (1998).
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this issue and solve any remaining questions left unanswered by the Miller
decision. 143
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Kennedy delivered the Court's opinion, which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas joined.144 In a five-to
four-decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. §
1409 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the gender distinction
used by the INS in granting citizenship to children born abroad to
unmarried parents.145 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote a
short concurrence stating that the Court did not have the power to grant the
relief of citizenship requested by the plaintiff because that power was
exclusively left to Congress. 46 Justice O'Connor dissented and was joined
by Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer.147 Justice O'Connor stated that
the majority failed to use the United States v. Virginia standard of
heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications.148  She stated the
governmental interests met by the statute's classification failed to satisfy
the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard, and she would find the
statute unconstitutional. 149
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Kennedy began the opinion by directly discussing the heart of
the petitioners' claim, the requirements and constitutionality of §
1409(a).150 He first closely examined the statutory requirements in situa-
tions when the child's father is a citizen and the mother is an alien, the
circumstance of Nguyen's case. 151 Justice Kennedy found that because
Boulais had not established paternity of Nguyen before he turned eighteen,
Nguyen did not meet the necessary requirements of clause four of § 1409(a)
143. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56 (2001). The Supreme Court chose to hear the Nguyen
case, because unlike in Miller and the three other lower court decisions, Nguyen's father, Boulais
was also a party to the case, which eliminated the standing issue. id. This made Nguyen the best
possible scenario to reach a solid resolution to this constitutional issue of gender disparity in
immigration law. Id. at 58.; see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 445 (1998).
144. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
145. Id. at 58-59; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2000).
146. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73 (Scalia, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148. Id.; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-56 (1996).
149. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 95-97.
150. Id. at 58; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(2).
151. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 59-60.
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and that the failure to meet all the conditions made Nguyen ineligible for
citizenship. 152
Justice Kennedy then evaluated the constitutionality of § 1409 by uti-
lizing the "heightened" scrutiny standard from United States v. Virginia for
suspect gender classifications.153 Section 1409(a) must serve "important
governmental objectives" and the discriminatory means must be
"substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." 154 Justice
Kennedy concluded that the heightened scrutiny standard was satisfied
because § 1409 implicates Congress's Immigration and Naturalization
plenary power.155 Justice Kennedy stated that normally a statute of this
type would be subjected to a more deferential standard, but regardless of the
level of scrutiny, § 1409 would pass because of the important governmental
interests involved in immigration regulation.156
Justice Kennedy remarked that citizen mothers can choose where their
children are born because they have the means to do so, but unmarried
fathers generally cannot control this. 157 He also noted that even though the
unmarried citizen father will have to fulfill some requirements before a
child born overseas can become a citizen, the statute does not impose any
limitations on when the child of an American citizen can establish
citizenship.158 This assertion of citizenship by a child is identical in the
statute for both genders, regardless of age. 159 These conditions were
reasonably imposed on fathers, because fathers have eighteen years to
comply.160 Justice Kennedy stated that the relevant distinction at issue was
the legitimization of a child by his or her father, via a declaration of
paternity.161 This legitimization was "justified by two important
government objectives." 162
The first governmental interest examined by the majority was the
importance of ensuring that an actual biological relationship exists between
the citizen parent and child.163 The mother's relationship is verified at the
child's birth, by virtue of hospital records or other witnesses who can testify
152. Id. at 60.
153. Id. (citing Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533).
154. Id. (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533).
155. Id. at 61 (citing Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434 n.l 1 (1998)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 61-62.
160. Id. at 62.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
[VOL. 78:147
CASE COMMENT
that the citizen mother gave birth to the child.164 An unmarried citizen
father, on the other hand, does not need to be present at birth.165 The
father's presence also does not ensure his absolute paternity of that child.166
The father's claims of paternity must be determined by some other measure
under § 1409, primarily medical or legal in nature. 167 Justice Kennedy
stated that Congress does not require deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
testing,168 but it made available three options of legitimization: DNA
testing, an oath of paternity, or a court order of paternity.169 These options
were found inherently reasonable by the Court. 70 Justice Kennedy stated
that a "hollow and neutral" law imposing the same requirements on citizen
mothers would not remedy an unlawful gender distinction.171 Justice
Kennedy declared that gender distinctions requiring the establishment of
paternity, but not maternity, take into account real biological differences
between men and women and the unique role of women in terms of
childbirth. 172
The second governmental interest furthered by § 1409 was the
assurance that the citizen parent and his child have some "demonstrated
opportunity or potential to develop not just a relationship that is recognized,
as a formal matter, by the law, but one that consists of real everyday ties
that provide a connection between child and citizen parent." 73 A mother
knows of the child's existence at birth and has an opportunity to develop a
real and meaningful relationship. 74 Inevitably, this opportunity does not
always exist for an unwed father, due to the nine-month time period
between conception and birth.75 Justice Kennedy discussed the ease of
foreign travel today by civilian Americans travelling alone.176 Justice
Kennedy stated that the principles of equal protection do not impose on
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 63.
168. Genetic paternity testing is done in laboratories that typically use blood samples or
cells scraped from inside the cheeks of the potential father, child, and natural mother.
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 438 n.13 (1998).
169. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 64.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 64-65 (citing Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 438-40 (1998)).
174. Id. at 65.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 66 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1999 PROFILE OF U.S. TRAVELERS TO
OVERSEAS DESTINATIONS 1 (2000)). The report stated that in 1999, Americans made over 25
million.trips abroad, spending an average of 15.1 nights out of the country. Id. This does not
include the almost 34 million visits by Americans to Canada and Mexico. Id.
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Congress the need to ignore the facts that children are born of short-term
relationships and the fathers may not know the children exist. 177
Section 1409 ensured the opportunity for the development of emotional
ties between foreign-born children and their fathers, which is critically
important to creating an initial point of contact equal to that of mother and
child at birth.178 Justice Kennedy stated that Congress was "well within its
authority" to make this limitation before "[committing] this country to
embracing a child as a citizen entitled as of birth to the full protection of the
United States, to the absolute right to enter its borders, and to full
participation in the political process." 179
Having found the governmental interests were important, Justice
Kennedy then looked at whether the means used to further that objective
were substantially related to that end.80 Justice Kennedy looked again at §
1409 and the requirement that granting of citizenship occurs before the
child reaches his or her eighteenth birthday.81 The majority compared this
to other immigration statutes concerning the children of married and
naturalized citizens and found that the age limit of eighteen was consistent
throughout immigration law. 182
Justice Kennedy also addressed Nguyen's claim that knowledge of a
child's birth does not guarantee the establishment of a parental bond, thus
the idea that men are less willing to develop a relationship with their
children must be considered a stereotype.183 The majority stated that the
actual proof of whether a relationship was substantial, would be subjective
and Congress used a more reliable, objective standard to ensure at least the
opportunity to develop that relationship. 184 Justice Kennedy stated that just
because the opportunity for a father and child to develop a bond does not
realize a positive relationship every time, that does not mean it fails under
177. Id.
178. Id. at 66-67.
179. Id. at 67.
180. Id. at68.
181. Id. at 65-69.
182. Id. at 69; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (2000) (stating that a child, who is born abroad of a
citizen and non-citizen parent, will become a citizen if, prior to the child's eighteen birthday, the
non-citizen parent becomes a naturalized citizen of the United States and the child resides in the
United States); see 8 U.S.C. § 1432 (2000) (stating that a child born of two non-citizen parents
abroad will become a citizen if both of the child's parents become naturalized citizens of the
United States and the child resides with his parents in the United States prior to his or her
eighteenth birthday).
183. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 69 (discussing the stereotype that unmarried fathers are less
qualified than mothers to make decisions regarding their children's welfare); see also Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979)
184. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 69.
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an equal protection challenge.185 The obligations put on a citizen father are
minimal under § 1409, with no "inordinate or unnecessary hurdles,"
because the father has eighteen years to accomplish them. 186
In addition, Justice Kennedy noted that under modem immigration law,
this statute was not the only way for Nguyen to become a citizen.1 87 Under
8 U.S.C. § 1423 and § 1427, an adult or child that did not qualify under
these guidelines, but who has substantial ties to the United States, may
apply to be a citizen in his or her own right.' 88 However, due to § 1427's
"good moral character" requirement, Nguyen would be barred because of
the seriousness of his criminal offenses.189
The last issue the Court examined was the remedy sought by Nguyen
and Boulais, the granting of citizenship.190 Justice Kennedy stated that even
if the Court had found the statute in part or in its entirety unconstitutional, it
could not grant the petitioners' request for citizenship.19' Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution grants Congress the exclusive power of conveying
citizenship.1 92 Justice Kennedy saw the intent of Congress to be very clear
when enacting the Immigration and Nationality Act, stating that this Act
was the "sole procedure" of naturalization. 193
In conclusion, the Court held that failing to acknowledge the most
basic biological differences between men and women would risk watering
down the concept of equal protection.194 The main concern of Justice
Kennedy was that a mechanical classification of gender differences might
obscure those distinctions that are truly prejudicial or misconceptual in
nature. 195 The majority found differences of men and women in the bearing
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 71.
188. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423, 1427 (2000).
189. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). "Good moral character" is defined under the Immigration and
Nationality Act as a person who is not a: (1) habitual drunkard, (2) person convicted of a crime of
moral turpitude or controlled substance crime, (3) gambler whose income is derived primarily
from illegal gambling activities, (4) gambler who has committed more than gambling offenses, (5)
person who has given false testimony to obtain the benefits of this Act, (6) person who has been
incarcerated for an aggregate period of 180 days or more regardless of the offense, or (7) person
who has been convicted of an aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2000); see also Nguyen v.
INS, 208 F.3d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 2000).
190. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 71 (2001).
191. Id. at 72. The Supreme Court's inability to provide a remedy in this case was the only
premise of Justice Scalia's brief concurrence. Id. at 74 (Scalia, J. concurring). Justice Scalia
stated that citizenship was only to be determined by Congress. Id.
192. Id. at 72; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
193. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 72; see also 8 U.S.C. §1421 (2000).
194. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73.
195. Id.
2002]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
of children to be real.196 Gender distinctions are not forbidden under equal
protection and did not hinder Congress in addressing the problem of
granting citizenship to children born abroad of unwed parents. 197
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DISSENT
Justice O'Connor began her dissent by discussing the development and
components of the heightened scrutiny standard as applied to gender-based
classifications.198 Justice O'Connor stated that statutes based on sex, even
if they accurately depict the way that the majority of men and women
behave, deny individuals opportunities when viewed in isolation.199 Justice
O'Connor argued that our nation has a history of stereotyping and
generalizing based solely on sex, which "reflect and reinforce 'fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females."' 200 It is because of
this past history that the government must show an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for any statute that uses gender classifications. 201 The govern-
ment had the complete burden of showing that the classification "serves an
important governmental objective" and that the means employed to promote
those objectives "are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." 202
Justice O'Connor also stated that the government's justification for a
gender-based classification must be important and genuine in nature, not
created exclusively for use in its defense.203 Overbroad generalizations
which rely on the differing "talents, capacities, or preferences of males and
females" are not permitted, even if they have supporting empirical data. 204
In looking at this type of case, the Court must look beyond the government
justification to the gender classification itself and determine its actual stated
purpose, not just accept a rationalization for actions based on different
grounds. 205 Justice O'Connor stated that the integral variable was a
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)).
201. Id. at 74-75.
202. Id. at 60-61 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724). Under rational basis scrutiny, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving the statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 75. The state does not
have to provide any evidence that the statute has any rational relation to the classification. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 76; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
205. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 76-77 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Virginia,
518 U.S. at 535-36.
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required connection between the stated means and the ends served. 206 The
statute deemed discriminatory must be "'substantially' related to an actual
and important government interest." 207
Justice O'Connor then challenged the majority's claim that the
heightened scrutiny standard was followed, because she stated that the
standard used deviated from heightened scrutiny's original principles. 208
The first deviation was that the majority failed to elaborate on its first
governmental interest, insuring that a biological connection between the
parent and child exists.209 The majority did not identify the importance of
that interest, nor did it demonstrate that this was the intent of Congress. 210
Justice O'Connor identified the major defect in the first governmental
interest as being that the "discriminatory means" did not fit the "asserted
end." 2 11
Justice O'Connor stated that the existence and certainty of the DNA
testing option has eliminated the need for not only court-ordered legitimi-
zation, but also for the age limit of eighteen. 212 She looked specifically at §
1409(a)(4), 213 in which there is no requirement of paternity testing, only
court adjudication or a written declaration of paternity. 214 She found it was
difficult to visualize how that clause furthered an important government
interest in the determination of paternity.2 15
Justice O'Connor stated that the best way to eliminate these gender
classifications was to move towards gender-neutral alternatives, which do
not trigger heightened scrutiny.216 Justice O'Connor stated that requiring
both unwed parents to provide proof of parentage would better serve the
206. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 77.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 78-79.
209. Id. at 79.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 80.
213. 8. U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2000). Section 1409(a)(4) states:
(a) The provisions.., shall apply as of the date of the birth to a person born out of
wedlock if...
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years-
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent court.
Id.
214. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 80 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 80-81.
216. Id. at 83. Justice O'Connor stated that the appropriate gender-neutral alternative would
be requiring both parents to prove their parenthood within a specific time period of the child's
birth, such as thirty days or by the child's eighteenth birthday. Id. at 81.
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government's asserted end of having children with identified parents,
whether by legal documentation or DNA testing.217
Justice O'Connor then looked at the majority opinion's second impor-
tant government interest, the demonstrated opportunity to develop a parent-
child relationship. 218 She did not find this second interest to be sufficient
under heightened scrutiny, because it focused just on the opportunity to
develop a relationship, rather than requiring an actual developed
relationship. 219 She stated that this watered down the "weight of the
interest." 220 Justice O'Connor focused on the age limitation of the statute,
finding that a determination of paternity before age eighteen did not further
the interests of Boulais and Nguyen because they had been living together
since Nguyen was six. 221 Because of the age limitation and Boulais' failure
to abide by this statute, Nguyen is now eligible for deportation even though
he has lived in the United States since childhood.222
Justice O'Connor stated that this situation in Nguyen would be elimi-
nated under a gender-neutral classification, giving fathers and mothers the
same opportunity, requiring only "that the parent be present at birth or have
knowledge of birth."223 The requirement of an affirmative act by the father
and not the mother is inconsistent with equal protection under the law. 224
Justice O'Connor stated that the majority failed to show that the gender
classification has a "close and substantial bearing" on the actual result,
depending on the facts of the case which must be proved by the govern-
ment. 225 The majority's holding that formal proof of a relationship would
be subjective and difficult to prove was rejected by Justice O'Connor.226
She concluded that administrative difficulties in carrying out the statutory
terms have never been a sufficient justification for allowing a gender-based
discrimination to stand. 227
According to Justice O'Connor, the history of this Act showed that it
was discriminatory in nature because it mandates that the child take the
nationality of the unwed mother and frees the father of any responsibility,
217. Id. at 83.
218. Id. at 83-84.
219. Id. at 84.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 85; see also Petitioner's Brief at 8, Nguyen (No. 99-207 1).
222. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 85 (2001).
223. Id. at 86.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 84.
226. Id. at 88.
227. Id.
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unless he performs an affirmative act to establish paternity. 228 Justice
Kennedy concluded that the affirmative act required of fathers was minimal
and does not create an "inordinate and unnecessary hurdle." 229 However,
Justice O'Connor stated that a facially discriminatory law is not redeemed
just because the barrier created by the statute was not insurmountable. 230
She did concede that the "failure to recognize relevant differences [between
the genders] is out of line with the command of equal protection," but she
continued to assert that only those sex-based differences that survive
heightened scrutiny should be allowed. 231
The last two issues addressed by Justice O'Connor were determining a
remedy for the plaintiff and congressional deference toward immigration
issues. 232 The existence of the severability clause233 in the Act indicates
that one clause can be found unconstitutional without harming the Act as a
whole.234 Another potential court action would be an extension,235 which
would void the injury of future parties not involved in this specific case.236
Extension would then allow Congress to revise the statute ensuring the
gender classification complies with the Constitution. 237
Lastly, Justice O'Connor distinguished the long-standing Court
deference to congressional power over immigration, stating that this "case
is not about the admission of aliens, but ... whether an individual is a
citizen in the first place." 238 Justice O'Connor stated that because the Act
governed the granting of citizenship at birth, the deference of Congress did
not apply, only the ordinary standards under equal protection review. 239
In conclusion, Justice O'Connor looked to the long line of gender
discrimination cases, which had applied heightened scrutiny to determine if
228. Id. at 89-91.
229. Id. at 93.
230. Id. at 94 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. A severability clause is defined as "[a] provision that keeps the remaining provisions of
a ... statute in force if any portion of that. . . statute is judicially declared void or
unconstitutional." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1378 (7th ed. 1999).
234. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 95 (2001); The Immigration and Nationality Act provides
that "if any particular provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circum-
stance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to other
persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby." Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, § 406, 66 Stat. 166, 281.
235. Extension is defined as "[a] period of additional time to take an action, make a
decision." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 604 (7th ed. 1999).
236. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 96 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 97.
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a constitutional violation has occurred. 240 Justice O'Connor stated that this
case was in error and considered it a deviation from those sex-based
classification cases and thus respectfully dissented.24 1
IV. IMPACT
Immigration law has long been the subject of intense scrutiny, and the
plurality's decision in Miller "fanned the flames" that the Nguyen Court is
now attempting to extinguish.242 Immediately following the Nguyen
decision, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit decision in United States v.
Ahumada-Aguilar243 and the Second Circuit decision in Ashcroft v. Lake244
and remanded them back to their respective circuits for reconsideration in
light of the Nguyen decision.245
A. POST-NGUYEN DECISIONS
The permissibility of a gender distinction under equal protection in the
Nguyen case has already had an impact across the nation. Since it was
decided on June 11, 2001, there have been twelve other lower court
decisions that have made mention of Nguyen.246 In only a short time, the
Court's decision has impacted a wide variety of constitutional areas. 247
240. Id. at 97.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 97; see generally Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
243. 533 U.S. 913 (2001).
244. 533 U.S. 913 (2001).
245. United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 533 U.S. 913 (2001); Ashcroft v. Lake, 533 U.S.
913 (2001).
246. Amador v. Hartford, 21 Fed. Appx. 68, 70 (2d Cir. 2001); Barton v. Ashcroft, 171 F.
Supp. 2d 86, 89-90 (D. Conn. 2001); Batista v. Ashcroft, 270 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2001); Breyer v.
Meissner, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18705, at *28 n.8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2001); Gerber v. Hickman,
264 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2001); Krishman v. Massanari, 158 F. Supp. 2d 67, 73 (D.D.C. 2001);
Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2001); Richland Bookmart v. Nichols, 2002 U.S.
App. LEXIS 879, at *15 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 2002); Saunders v. White, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3573,
at *110-* 11 (Mar. 4, 2002); Tappe v. Alliance Capital Mgmt., 177 F. Supp. 2d 176, 182-83
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); United States v. Cervantes-Nava, 281 F.3d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 2002); Webster v.
Ryan, 729 N.Y.S.2d 315, 334-35 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2001).
247. In Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1 (2002), the court affirmed the holding in Nguyen
that "pregnancy is one immutable characteristic that distinguishes men from women and
consequently has definite real life consequences." Laro, 259 F.3d at 14. In Gerber v. Hickman,
264 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2001), the court using Nguyen's basic premise on gender
classifications stated that prison officials "cannot ignore the biological differences between men
and women." Gerber, 264 F.3d at 891. The court held the warden must treat male and female in-
mates as equal as possible, based on the biological differences the Supreme Court held appropriate
in Nguyen, and this will not violate their rights under equal protection. Id. at 890-92. Amador v.
Hartford, Batista v. Ashcroft, Krishman v. Massanari, Richland Bookmart v. Nichols, Saunders v.
White, and Tappe v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. will not be discussed in detail as the Nguyen case was
only mentioned in each case as a secondary source of information on the issue of gender
discrimination. Amador, 21 Fed Appx. at 70; Batista, 270 F.3d at 14; Krishman, 158 F. Supp. 2d
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In Barton v. Ashcroft,248 the District Court of Connecticut discussed
Nguyen's upholding of § 1409 as a parallel to the immigration statute in
question, 8 U.S.C. § 1432, which gave automatic citizenship to a child born
abroad when one or both of the child's parents become United States
citizens. 249 The court stated that § 1432 promoted the same important
governmental interests of ensuring that a biological relationship exists and
of demonstrating the potential for a parent and child relationship. 250 The
court found these interests to be important because not only does it give the
child ties to the parent, but also to the United States. 251
In Breyer v. Meissner,252 the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania distinguished the INS's use of the Nguyen decision.253 In
Breyer, the district court found that this case was about the expatriating acts
of Mr. Breyer as a German solider assigned to "Death's Head." 254 The INS
argued that even if Mr. Breyer's expatriation was found to be involuntary,
due to his conscription into the Nazi German Army during World War II,
the court lacked the power to declare Mr. Breyer a citizen, for that was
Congress's power alone. 255 The district court reasoned that in Nguyen,
because Nguyen was found not to be a citizen at birth, due to the Court's
upholding the constitutionality of gender distinction in the Immigration and
Nationality Act, Nguyen's only option to obtain citizenship was through
naturalization.256 However, the government's use of the word, "expatria-
tion," in Breyer infers that Mr. Breyer was a citizen at his birth by virtue of
his mother's United States citizenship, thus undermining Nguyen's
relevance to the case. 257
at 73; Nichols, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 879, at *15; Saunders, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3573, at
*110-* 111; and Tappe, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
248. 171 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Conn. 2001).
249. Barton, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 89-90; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) (2000) (repealed Oct.
30, 2001, 114 Stat. 1631) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (2000)). Five days after the Barton
decision, Congress repealed § 1432 and consolidated its requirements into § 1431 and added
conditions to the automatic conveying of citizenship to children by stipulating this conveyance
must occur before the age of eighteen and the child must be "residing in the United States in the
legal and physical custody of the citizen parent" at the time of that conveyance. Id. § 1431 (a)(3).
250. Barton, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 89-90.
251. Id.
252. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18705 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2001).
253. Breyer, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18705, at *28 n.8; see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53,
72 (2001).
254. Breyer, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18705, at *29.
255. Id. at *28, n.8
256. Id.
257. Id.
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Webster v. Ryan, 258 is the most expansive review of the Nguyen
decision thus far.259 A New York family court held that "a child has an
independent constitutionally guaranteed right to maintain contact with a
person with whom the child has developed a parent-like relationship." 260
The court examined the Nguyen case, stating that the Supreme Court
ignored a more "family approach." 261 The Webster court reasoned that
Nguyen can be looked at as a case that allows the right of a child to
establish his or her own citizenship, by virtue of the child's citizen father.262
The court expanded on this idea stating that the Supreme Court should have
allowed a "tolling provision," giving the child a reasonable amount of time
to establish citizenship once he or she had reached the age of eighteen. 263
The court concluded that the law looks "much different when viewed
through the constitutional eyes of a child."264
B. ILLEGITIMACY-UNDERLYING ISSUE OF NGUYEN
The issue of an illegitimate child's rights, separate of his or her citizen
father, was not addressed by the Court in Nguyen and has not been
thoroughly addressed in general terms by the Supreme Court since the 1989
plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.265 One of the first "pro-child"
decisions came in 1972, in Weber v. AETNA Casualty & Surety.266 The
Court held in Weber that condemning a child on the basis of his or her birth
is illogical and unjust.26 7 A year later in Gomez v. Perez,268 the Court
struck down a state action, stating that once a judicially enforceable right,
such as child support, is determined for a illegitimate child, there is no
"constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential
right." 269
258. 729 N.Y.S.2d 315 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 2001).
259. Webster, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 334-35.
260. Id. at 316.
261. Id. at 334. The "family approach" decides cases looking through the eyes of children.
Id. The court must examine why a child's right to citizenship should be altered by which parent
was a citizen at the child's birth. Id.
262. Id. at 334.
263. Id. at 334-35.
264. Id. at 335.
265. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
266. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
267. Weber, 406 U.S. at 175-76 (holding that denying children their parent's workmen's
compensation death benefits solely because they are illegitimate violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
268. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
269. Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538.
[VOL. 78:147
CASE COMMENT
Yet a little over fifteen years after Gomez, the plurality opinion of
Michael H. v. Gerald D decided against the establishment of a child's
right.270 The Court upheld a California law that denied a third party the
right to establish paternity of a child born to a married couple, because
under the law a child is presumed to be the husband's child.27 1 This was
despite blood test results obtained by the mother and the natural father,
showing that he was in fact the father of the child.272 Also, the natural
father had lived periodically with the mother and daughter, held the child
out as his own, aided in her support, and more importantly, the daughter
considered Michael H. her father.273 This was evidenced by the daughter
who, via a guardian-at-litem, also sued to uphold her equal protection rights
to maintain a relationship with her natural father. 274 The Court held that she
was not illegitimate, and she was entitled to maintain her relationship with
her "legal" parents. 275 The Court based its opinions on California's
legislative intent and determined the integrity and privacy of the family was
overriding social policy and should not be disturbed.276 The Court upheld
the constitutionality of the law.277
The issue of illegitimacy has recently been brought into the forefront.
On February 4, 2002, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided United
States v. Cervantes-Nava,278 which challenged § 1409(c) of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act, pertaining to the issue of children born out of the
country to citizen mothers. 279 Section 1409(c) stated in order for an illegiti-
mate child to acquire citizenship at birth, the child's mother must be a
citizen and be physically present for a continuous period of one year at the
child's birth.280 In contrast, a legitimate child of a citizen mother had to
prove that she maintained a United States residence for ten years, with five
270. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989).
271. Id. The only people who could rebut this presumption under California law were the
mother and presumed father of the child. Id. at 152-53. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The law also
limited these challenges to circumstances involving issues of sterility, of parents living apart, or
when the husband denies paternity. Id.; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 62 1(c) (West 1989).
272. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114-15.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 130-31.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 119-20.
277. Id.
278. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1661 (Feb. 4, 2002).
279. Cervantes-Nava, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1661 at *5-*6; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c)
(2000).
280. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
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of those years occurring after the child's mother attained the age of
fourteen. 28'
The plaintiff claimed that § 1409(c) violated his right to equal pro-
tection, because his mother did not fulfill those requirements. 282 The Fifth
Circuit examined whether the courts may sever portions of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act, finding those specific portions unconstitutional.283
This severance could be done in a manner that expanded citizenship, a
question that was reserved by the Nguyen court, or the court could find the
entire statute unconstitutional. 284 However, the court ultimately held that
neither option would cure his status as an alien, which had been proven by
the government beyond a reasonable doubt.285 The court left the constitu-
tionality of classification by illegitimacy within § 1409(c) unresolved. 286
C. ILLEGITIMACY AND NORTH DAKOTA LAW
These types of laws are not a rarity. A similar law exists in North
Dakota that states that a father is presumed to be the natural father to a child
if the parents are married at the time of birth.287 The laws of the State of
North Dakota on their face appear more flexible, stating that the
presumption may be overturned by another court decree establishing
paternity by. another man. 288 The presumption must be overturned only by
clear and convincing evidence.289 The most recent challenge to this law
was in 1993, in B.H. v. K.D290 when the North Dakota Supreme Court
addressed a constitutional challenge of sexual discrimination by an unmar-
281. Id. § 1401(g) (2001).
282. Cervantes-Nava, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1661 at *10-*12.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at *11-*12.
287. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-04 (1999). Section 14-17-04 states that a man is presumed
the father of a child, if the man and child's mother are married to each other when the child is born
or if the child is born within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment,
divorce or legal separation. Id. The man is also presumed to be the father if: (1) the man ac-
knowledges his paternity in writing with the N.D. Dept. of Health, (2) the man is put on the birth
certificate as the father with his consent, (3) the man is required to pay child support under a
written promise or voluntary court order, (4) man takes his child into his home while under the
age of eighteen, and acknowledges he is the father, (5) man acknowledges the paternity of the
child in writing to the N.D. Dept of Health and the natural mother does not dispute it, (6) genetic
testing shows he is not excluded and has more than a ninety-five percent probability of parenting
the child. Id.
288. Id. § 14-17-04(2).
289. Clear and convincing evidence would seem to indicate, under section 14-17-04 (1)(f),
that a genetic test finding the statistical probability of paternity ninety-five percent or higher
would rebut a presumption of paternity. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-04 (l)(f) (1999).
290. 506 N.W.2d 368 (N.D. 1993).
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ried male attempting to determine paternity of a married couple's young
daughter.291 This ruling, which denied standing to the third party male,
effectively negated any opportunity to challenge this presumption of
paternity by a "potential" father unless he has the genetic testing at hand.292
The North Dakota Century Code states in section 14-17-02 that "a parent
and child relationship extends equally to every child and every parent,
regardless of the marital status of the parents." 293 The ruling in B.H. v. K.D.
does appear to establish a precedent that nullifies the intent of the North
Dakota statute and, more importantly, denies the opportunity of a child to
determine his or her true parentage. 294 As in Nguyen, the issue of bias in
laws due to illegitimacy seems to have yet to be resolved.295
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Nguyen stated that failing to acknowledge the
most basic biological differences between men and women waters down the
concept of equal protection. 296 The Court held that it was permissible for
Congress to address complex issues in immigration and naturalization by
using gender distinctions. 297 The Court allowed these distinctions as long
as the means used to further the government's objective of determining
actual paternity and creating an opportunity to establish a parent/child
291. B.H., 506 N.W.2d at 376. The plaintiff (B.H.) had originally petitioned to the district
court to order the genetic testing, which was granted, and the defendants appealed to the North
Dakota Supreme Court. Id. at 371. The mother admitted that she and the third party had been
sexually active around the time of her daughter's conception. Id. This was prior to the mother's
marriage to the presumed father. Id. at 370-71. The Court in examining the plaintiff's assertion of
gender discrimination in the determination of paternity stated:
The differences [between men and women] are the very foundation of the
classification. Here, they are obvious. The woman carries the child through pregnancy.
When born of her, the fact of motherhood is obvious. Not so the man. The proof of
fatherhood or the proof of the lack thereof, must come from an external source. The
entire classification within the Act is premised on this basic and obvious distinction, it
is not invidious, but "realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly
situated" in the circumstances. Men do not bear children and give birth to them.
Id. The court continued that to determine the existence or nonexistence of the mother would be
absurd and presumptuous. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court seemed to stagnate on the
standing issue of a third party male against a married couple in a paternity. Id. The court held
that the male party, who is not the "presumed father" by virtue of marriage to the mother, can not
bring a challenge unless he has blood tests that prove he is the natural father. Id. at 375. In
Justice Meschke's dissent, he found that this ruling allows the mother to "pick" who she wants to
be the father, stepping all over the procedural rights of the "potential" father who is willing to be
involved in his child's life. Id. at 384 (Meschke, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 375.
293. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-02 (2001).
294. B.H., 506 N.W.2d at 376.
295. Id.
296. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
297. Id.
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relationship in children born abroad of United States citizens are
substantially related to that end. 298 The Court has, for now, put to rest the
issue of paternity determination of an illegitimate child born overseas by
upholding the constitutionality of § 1409 and resolving the split in the
circuits.299 However, it is the underlying issue of continued discrimination
of illegitimate children that is looming on the Supreme Court's horizon, as
well as in the State of North Dakota's Supreme Court's future, and will
need to be resolved to insure equal protection for citizens of all ages.300
Darla J. Schuman*
298. Id. at 70.
299. Id. at 73.
300. See supra notes 278-286 and accompanying text.
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